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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Continue to monitor new trends in virtual
and electronic markets and finance.

Travel restrictions and lockdowns have forced
changes to the traditional means illicit groups
have used to launder their ill-gotten profits.
This paper explores whether COVID-19 may
have affected these processes through three
main channels:

Given the accelerated growth of online commerce and peer-to-peer finance in daily life,
these innovations and tools will likely influence
criminal transactions. In short, it will be necessary when monitoring and prosecuting illicit
activity not to assume that it will be business
as usual following 2021.

1. Increased reliance on cryptocurrencies to
move and launder funds tied to illicit activity;
2. The expanded use of the internet through
e-commerce sites to continue and expand
trade mispricing practices to move illicit
funds; and,
3. The use of FinTech and peer-to-peer payment services to transfer illicit funds.

For now, at least, the pandemic’s impact on
money laundering appears to have been more
balanced. Despite many traditional means of
laundering money—such as through casinos or
high cash turnover businesses—being closed
to criminals, there has not yet been a detectable, significant jump in the use of cryptocurrencies or FinTech in money laundering.
Where there is more evidence of an increase
in likely illicit activity is in e-commerce. Trade
mispricing in person-to-person transactions
is a commonly used technique. Increasingly,
however, that has moved to online commerce,
a trend that has increased under COVID-19 as
global trade and supply chains were disrupted
by the pandemic and economic contraction.
Nevertheless, the implications of the COVID-19
pandemic on the global economy, markets,
commercial relations, global supply chain, and
daily life of citizens will be felt for years to come.
The same is true of the virus’s effects on illicit
markets and money laundering. Changes in the
structure of global financial markets had already
started before the pandemic but have been accelerated by the events of 2020. For these reasons, there a number of areas that governments
and anti-money laundering groups will need to
focus on in the coming years.
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Update and tighten the regulation and monitoring of FinTech and Cryptocurrencies.
While Bitcoin and the other cryptocurrencies
have not translated into as large and central a
market as many imagined for illicit transactions
before COVID-19, the need to push financial
transactions and money laundering to virtual means or hold on to cash indicate the move
toward these platforms may just be beginning.
In cryptocurrency markets, focus on known
over the counter brokers.
As researchers and law enforcement officials
identify the owners of cryptocurrency wallets
used by criminals, they should share that information through international law enforcement
and financial agencies such as Interpol, Europol,
and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Such
an effort could create an alert system, similar
to Interpol’s red list for wanted international
criminals, but dedicated to known wallets and
brokers engaging in illicit transactions.
Upgrade government capacity to track and
understand the cryptocurrency world.
Anti-money laundering software that helps officials identify potential sites and transactions
related to money laundering—based on tested
high-risk areas, transactions, and wallets—can
help track and capture or at least shut down
bad actors in the rapidly-changing cryptocurrency ecosystem.
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Work with China to identify and shut down
money-laundering operations.
Given China’s growing global network and
footprint commercially and financially, a desire
to project itself as a legitimate economic actor
will work to the advantage of regulators and
law enforcement agencies that combat money
laundering.

INTRODUCTION
Successful international criminal groups are
innovative and highly adaptable. Smuggling
routes and methods adjust according to circumstances—tightened security on one border
crossing will encourage the exploration of alternative routes or new methods altogether. Criminal organizations are adept at finding and exploiting the weakest link to achieve their means,
adapting to the latest developments, and identifying opportunities that law-abiding citizens
may never have considered possible.
These characteristics apply equally to money laundering, the process by which proceeds
from illicit activities are “cleaned” and made
available for use in legitimate society. Criminal
groups launder funds through various means
and methods, assessing simplicity, speed, cost,
and risk. Clearly, this varies in each situation
and from country to country, according to the
legal framework and the country’s capacity to
police it. However, as a guiding principle, the
tightening of one loophole encourages criminals to find alternative means of cleaning their
illicit profits.
The COVID-19 pandemic and the associated
response by governments have led to potential shifts in criminal behavior, including money
laundering. The closure of small businesses and
borders and disruptions of trade flows during
national lockdowns has presented a challenge
for criminal entities in many better-policed jurisdictions, forcing some to warehouse rather
than launder cash, putting them at greater risk.
Others have attempted to launder funds through
the purchase and sale of high-value goods, such
as real estate or precious gems. These options
are not without risk at the best of times, particularly as traditional means to launder mon-

ey and how to spot and counter them are well
known by law enforcement agencies the world
over. However, during the COVID-19 pandemic,
and following the introduction of the associated policies intended to contain its spread, the
risks to these criminal groups were potentially
reduced since the drastic and rapid change to
working practices may have reduced the capacity of law enforcement and regulators assigned
to monitor, investigate, and prosecute potential
money-laundering activity.1
In addition to the impact on day-to-day activities, the pandemic may well have exacerbated or expedited pre-existing trends whereby
criminal organizations were seeking to exploit
e-commerce businesses and use cryptocurrencies to launder funds. With restrictions on
physical movement in place, it is probable that
greater attention has shifted to this method.
This Chatham House paper provides a comparison of the likely trends used by criminal
groups to launder their illicit profits in light of
the COVID-19 pandemic by drawing on publicly
available information and firsthand interviews.
The pages that follow examine the availability
and use of cryptocurrencies for money laundering, including whether their role is a viable
medium to transfer and launder monies for and
from illicit commerce. The paper also explores
the potential and use of virtual marketplaces,
especially shared-economy and peer-to-peer
commercial and financial platforms, as a means
for laundering illicit profits and the potential
role of peer-to-peer and contactless systems
through FinTech for illicit transactions. Lastly,
the paper returns to the more traditional means
of shadow banks and trade-based money laundering and whether COVID-19 and other tech
options have shifted those patterns of use. In
doing so, we examine trends globally and provide policy recommendations for U.S. and Latin
American policymakers.
Based on these new and traditional tools and
platforms for money laundering and changes in
their use, the paper concludes with a series of
recommendations, including ways that national
and international judicial and security organizations can better understand and track emerging and older trends in money laundering. The
paper also discusses the implications for better
tightening regulations on cryptocurrency transactions by national and international author-
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ities, improving oversight of e-commerce and
trade mispricing, and understanding and interrupting shadow banking networks organized
around Chinese commerce.

BACKGROUND
There are several ways that COVID-19 has
raised the risk for illicit activity. The pandemic
presented new criminal opportunities relating
to the provision of medical equipment and numerous scams and cyberattacks.2 For instance,
the increased number of remotely performed
transactions coupled with a rising number of
inexperienced users, such as the elderly, resulted in a rapid escalation in online financial
fraud.3 Government responses such as bailouts
have also presented opportunities for fraud and
theft, possibly helped by the work-from-home
regimes that may have made money-laundering tracking activities more difficult. That large
numbers of individuals are working from home
has also presented new opportunities relating
to the increased use of internet shopping and
banking.4 At the same time, the global economic
slowdown and the spike in unemployment—especially in Latin America and the Caribbean—
may have resulted in a greater propensity for
criminal activity to compensate for economic
insecurity and loss of income. Previously legitimate businesses struggling because of the
pandemic may, for instance, be tempted to receive payment for moving funds through their
accounts. Some criminal groups also appear to
have targeted elderly individuals who are out of
work to act as “money mules,” laundering money through their accounts for a small fee.5
Changing behavior in the population at large may
also have facilitated criminal behavior. For example, a dramatic shift toward contactless payments to avoid viral transmission may well have
made it more difficult to distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate activity. The pandemic appears to have expedited a pre-existing
trend in the general economy whereby criminals may accept card payments for illicit goods.
But other impacts of the pandemic have been
negative for criminals and forced them to adopt
riskier behaviors. Travel restrictions have forced
changes to smuggling methods, preventing

5

the use of drug mules. They have also made it
harder to physically move cash overseas. In line
with national lockdowns, the temporary closure
of numerous legitimate businesses previously used to launder cash—restaurants, sports
clubs, and other cash-dominated businesses,
as well as casinos—has forced criminal groups
to warehouse cash or launder funds through
purchasing high-value items such as jewelry,
precious metals, boats and vehicles, and real
estate, evidenced through the increased quantity and volume of cash seizures.6
The question is, to what extent have these processes been altered by the COVID-19 pandemic
and the associated response by governments?
As typically defined, money laundering is comprised by a three-step process:
•

Placement of illicit profits into the banking
system or, more generally, moving funds
away from their original cash source into
another form (includes purchasing of luxury goods such as valuable artwork and antiques, bonds, lottery tickets, etc.).

•

Layering, to disguise the funds from the
original source. In this instance, launderers
move funds between accounts to hinder
the audit trail. This step is often repeated
multiple times to further obscure attempts
to locate the source of the illicit profits.

•

Integration, in which illegal proceeds are
reintegrated into the legitimate financial
system for assimilation with other assets
in the system and reunited with the launderer.

We hypothesize that COVID-19 may have affected these processes through three main
channels:
•

Increased reliance on cryptocurrencies to
move and launder funds tied to illicit activity;7

•

The expanded use of the internet through
e-commerce sites to continue and expand
trade mispricing practices to move illicit
funds;8 and

•

The use of FinTech and peer-to-peer payment services to transfer funds.9
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The logic for the increased use of more impersonal internet and mobile systems for illegal activities that don’t involve face-to-face
exchange, including but not limited to money
laundering, certainly exists given the limited
economic activity and restrictions on personal
contact and travel associated with COVID-19.
These restrictions would have limited the opportunities to move and launder cash through
more traditional means, such as trade mispricing, retail operations, or through casinos, “money mules,” and shell companies.
In the years leading up to the COVID-19 pandemic, user sharing economies and markets
(such as eBay, Airbnb, and others), cashless
payment methods and peer-to-peer payment
systems (such as Venmo), and the spread of the
number and use of cryptocurrencies had grown.
A 2017 Brookings Institution study concluded
that, by 2025, the sharing economy would grow
to US$335 billion.10 At the same time, cashless
payments had already increased. According
to a late 2021 YouGov survey in 21 countries,
74 percent of citizens in Sweden had already
turned away from cash to digital means of payment before the pandemic. While Swedish consumers are the most plugged into FinTech, 60
percent of Chinese individuals polled report
that they too rely on the internet and virtual
platforms for commerce and financial transactions, as do 59 percent of those in Denmark,
and 46 percent in the United States.11
Some of these platforms were exploited for illicit activities and money laundering even before
the pandemic.12 The emergence, expansion of
options, and increased use of cryptocurrencies have also provided a virtual means of conducting illicit commerce and laundering money.
While the scope of the use of cryptocurrencies
for large-scale, massive money laundering outside the dark web has been disputed, the general opinion is that cryptocurrencies and different
means of hiding the identity of those conducting the transactions have provided a new potent vehicle for illicit financial transactions.13 As
the Global Financial Action Task Force of Latin
America (GAFILAT) states, “the use of virtual
currencies such as Bitcoin have made detecting
the illegal transfer of money ever more difficult.
Moreover, the use of proxy servers and anonymizing software makes the third component
of money laundering—integration—almost impossible to detect, as money can be transferred

or withdrawn leaving little or no trace of an IP
[Internet Protocol] address.”14 Some of this, as
discussed below, is debatable, as is the scope
of the illicit activities relative to other more legitimate investors and investments.
At least it was until the COVID-19 pandemic.
Despite the advances in internet access and
reliability, the e-economy, FinTech, and cryptocurrencies—cash and the U.S. dollar in particular—remained central to the black market and
criminal economies. According to the American
Institute for Economic Research, “more than a
third of all U.S. currency in circulation is used by
criminals and tax cheats.”15
In the first quarter of 2020, as we witnessed
the start of the lockdowns globally, cash withdrawals rose as individuals prepared for the
unexpected. According to the FATF, the periods
approaching potential lockdowns saw spikes in
the withdrawal of cash from accounts.16 While
the vast majority of those withdrawals were
for legitimate reasons, the sudden jump of
cash in circulation provides several options for
money laundering. For example, at the start of
COVID-19, the FATF warned that “When financial markets stabilize, large movements to redeposit funds could provide cover to efforts at
laundering illicit funds, including banknotes.”17
Similarly, the FATF speculated that “[b]anknotes
can be used to purchase safe-haven assets
(e.g., gold), which are less easily traceable.”18
The report continues that later, customers involved in illicit withdrawal or transitions of cash
could mask those by citing them as COVID-19
related activities.
Nevertheless, according to the YouGov survey,
COVID-19 accelerated the global shift to more
cashless societies.19 In a chart titled, “The pandemic speeds up the decline of cash globally,”
YouGov details the steep drop in the use of
cash in 21 countries in favor of electronic payments, adding to the base of those who were
already primarily relying on these means. For
example, 50 percent of those surveyed in the
United Kingdom said they had curtailed their
use of cash since the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic, “while 37% already mostly paid digitally.”20 Certainly, the closure of retail banks and
the increased reliance by retailers and vendors
on cashless payments accelerated the trend.
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For these reasons, the FATF issued a set of
warnings in mid-2020 concerning the impact
of COVID-19 on financial regulation and anti-money laundering. Several of them directly
addressed the risks associated with the internet, cashless transactions, and cryptocurrencies. The FATF raised red flags on the following
issues:
•

•

•

“With global trade volumes in decline and
individual travel at a near standstill, conventional transnational organised crime
schemes that take advantage of global
supply chains and the traditional illicit revenue schemes of organised crime groups
are impacted by COVID-19.” 21
“Reporting indicates significant changes in financial behaviours and patterns in
light of COVID-19. Many bank offices and
branches are closed due to public health
and ‘lockdown’ measures. Customers are
therefore carrying out more transactions
remotely. Over the medium to long-term,
an economic downturn could further alter
financial activities and result in individuals
seeking financing outside the formal economy.”22
“Increased remote transactions: FATF and
FSRB [FATF-Style Regional Bodies] members report that some banks have closed
their physical branches, reduced opening
hours or restricted the services available
in-person. Members also report increased
online banking activities, including customer on-boarding and identity verification. Some supervisors have clarified that,
in line with a risk-based approach, banks
can postpone certain elements of customer identity verification during confinement
periods. However, FATF and FSRB members
note that some financial institutions may
not be equipped to verify customers’ identity remotely.”23

The FATF also mentioned the case of one individual who used virtual assets to launder proceeds earned from selling fraudulent COVID-19
medicine.24 These risks were compounded
by the restrictions on in-person and in-office
work. According to the FATF:
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•

The COVID-19 pandemic is also impacting
government and private sector abilities
to implement anti-money laundering and
counterterrorist financing obligations from
supervision, regulation, and policy reform
to suspicious transaction reporting and international cooperation.

•

These threats and vulnerabilities represent
emerging money laundering and terrorist
financing risks. Such risks could result in:
• Criminals finding ways to bypass customer due diligence measures;
• Increased misuse of online financial
services and virtual assets to move
and conceal illicit funds;
• Exploiting economic stimulus measures and insolvency schemes as a
means for natural and legal persons
to conceal and launder illicit proceeds;
• Increased use of the unregulated financial sector, creating additional
opportunities for criminals to launder
illicit funds;
• Misuse and misappropriation of domestic and international financial aid
and emergency funding; and
• Criminals and terrorists exploiting
COVID-19 and the associated economic downturn to move into new
cash-intensive and high-liquidity
lines of business in developing countries.25

Now, more than 20 months since the threat of
COVID-19 became a public concern, how many
of these warnings have come to pass? The short
answer is that it is still too early to tell. This is
due, in part, to the gaps in administration, research, and reporting mentioned above that
have made tracking and reporting difficult. It is
also too soon to draw conclusions about any
emerging patterns, especially since any picture
of the flow of illicit goods and services against
which to compare expectations of financial
transactions and laundering is incomplete. According to several incomplete studies, while
drug use may have shifted in terms of the type
of drug, it did not decline significantly. While social distancing and lockdowns complicated illic-
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it drug trafficking and the street sale of drugs,
the consumption of stimulating and “socializing or party” drugs likely declined, though the
use of psychoactive or other drugs may have
increased.26 These data and reporting gaps
also complicate the ability to project COVID-19
linked trends to the future.
Despite these limitations, it is still possible to
infer some trends and possible impacts that
can lead to several limited recommendations.
As discussed in the concluding section, the
uniqueness and novelty of the convergence
of these new financial technologies with the
human, commercial, financial, and economic
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic present a
growing number of challenges that will require
greater international collaboration to overcome.
Among them are the proliferation and use of
“mixers” or “tumblers” to hide the identity of
those using of cryptocurrencies for illegal activities and the increasing use of online or shared
economy commercial platforms for trade-based
money laundering.

ARE CRYPTOCURRENCIES A
SIGNIFICANT VEHICLE FOR
MONEY LAUNDERING OR IS
CASH STILL KING? THE
TECHNICAL ACADEMIC AND
POLICY DEBATES
The extent to which cryptocurrencies, from the
better-known Bitcoin and Ethereum to other
lesser-known and circulated cryptoassets,27 are
and can be used to facilitate illicit transactions
has been hotly debated by policymakers, financial analysts, law enforcement officials, and
scholars. Of these cryptocurrencies (also known
as virtual assets), Bitcoin is the dominant player. It was the first significant cryptocurrency of
its type and, in 2018, accounted for 66 percent
of the more than 2,000 cryptocurrencies.28
Certainly, Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies
have received their fair share of attention and
accusations from policymakers and journalists,
including in July 2018 when Federal Reserve
Chairman Jerome Powell told the U.S. Congress
that such virtual assets are “great” for mon-

ey laundering.29 Many of them have properties
that would lend them to becoming the preferred
source of asset for illicit transactions, including
money laundering. While traditional transfers
that must pass through a trusted third-party
institution—such as a bank—can be slow and
cumbersome (made so, in part, because of national and international regulations intended to
alert authorities of cash flow suspected to be
linked to terrorism and illicit commerce), transfers via cryptocurrency can be made anytime.
Transactions are, on average, approved every
10 minutes, according to tech entrepreneur
and author Andreas Antonopoulos,30 and the
fees are relatively cheap, especially compared
to transfer fees charged by traditional banks.
Without a third-party broker, cryptocurrency
transactions are decentralized and conducted through self-enrolled participants by creating one’s own key pair, a combination of a
public key used to encrypt data and a private
key used to decrypt it. The decentralized system allows transactions to be conducted with
a certain degree of anonymity outside the rules
and oversight of financial institutions subject
to anti-money laundering regulations and law
enforcement, including know-your-customer
requirements and the automatic investigation
into transfers over certain thresholds.31
Despite the decentralized structure for transfers, Bitcoin and most major cryptocurrencies
have not turned out as anonymous as initially thought. For this reason, Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies are increasingly referred to as
pseudonymous rather than anonymous. User
passkey information required for transactions
needs to be registered, and the digital wallets
involved in transfers can be identified by “tracing wallet ownership, token provenance, source
IP addresses, and user identification.”32 According to Anton Moiseienko and Kayla Izenman,
99 percent of the currency transactions in the
years before COVID-19 were performed through
centralized exchanges that were “subject to
AML/CFT [Anti-money laundering/counterterrorist financing] regulation similar to traditional
banks or exchanges.”33
Because of the pseudonymous nature of standard Bitcoin transactions, criminal elements began turning to the dark web to hide the identity
of the users. Drawing on U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) data, Camila Russo calculated that approximately 90 percent of Bitcoin
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transactions in 2013 were related to criminal
activities.34 Increasingly, that occurred through
means, such as Tor, Freenet, and I2P, to access
the dark web anonymously.35 The creation of
privacy coins, such as Zcash and Monero, also
offered a hidden means for illicit activity—although one analysis of Monero could trace the
parties in the transactions in 88 percent of the
cases. According to Erik Silfversten, Marina Favaro, Linda Slapakova, Sascha Ishikawa, James
Liu, and Adrian Salas, most criminals who use
cryptocurrencies continue to rely on Bitcoin because of its dominance and relative stature.36
Criminals have also turned to “tumblers” or
“mixers” that pass cryptocurrencies and transactions across chains and through unregulated exchanges to hide their identities. Those
processes pool cryptocurrency deposits and
spread them across wallets; after they have
been washed, they redeposit them with customers. According to one source, “[m]ixers have
consistently processed about a quarter of incoming illicit Bitcoins per year,” although their
unreliability has been a constraint on their full
adoption.37 The attractiveness of cryptocurrencies to criminals has also been dampened by
the rise of cryptocurrency intelligence companies that track transactions to assist law enforcement and other parties.38
Despite these advances, until 2020, cryptocurrencies as a means to transfer and launder illicit funds remained underused. According to a
2020 Chainalysis study, in 2019, approximately
US$11.5 billion of cryptocurrency was spent on
illicit activity. In all, this totaled a mere 1.1 percent of the total activities of cryptocurrencies.
In 2015, Europol declared that cash was still the
preferred means for criminals to conduct transactions and launder money.39
This is not to say cryptocurrencies do not have
a role or that these analyses capture all the
criminal activities that occur or are laundered
through them. Because of the legal transaction costs, cryptocurrencies are easily used
for “smurfing” or transferring small amounts
of money to avoid detection by authorities or
bank regulators—something that is often prohibitively expensive because of transfer fees in
established financial institutions.
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China has played a disproportionate role within the cryptocurrency world in the growth and
use of those currencies for licit and illicit purposes. According to a 2021 report published
by Chainalysis, Inc., Chinese over-the-counter
brokers “have played an outsized role in facilitating money laundering for those involved in
cryptocurrency-based crime.”40 According to
the same report, between “April 2019 and June
2021, Chinese [crypto wallet] addresses have
sent over US$2.2 billion worth of cryptocurrency to [crypto wallet] addresses associated
with illicit activity such as scams and dark web
market operations and received over US$2.0
billion.” The bulk of this period spans the 15
months when the world was in the throes of the
COVID-19 pandemic and its associated social
distancing and lockdown policies.
At an official countrywide level, El Salvador has
curiously moved toward adopting Bitcoin with
uncertain consequences, not just for the country’s economy and citizens’ access to cash, but
also for the broader global anti-money laundering and law enforcement community. The September 2021 adoption by El Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele of Bitcoin as the country’s
national currency has raised suspicion of ulterior motives, in part because around 30 percent
of the population is unbanked, complicating
their ability to access their accounts. While the
40-year-old president hailed the move as a way
to reduce the cost of remittances being sent by
friends and family to El Salvador—remittances
represent 20 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP)41—there has been speculation that the unexpected shift could obscure
criminal activities and funds. Allegations of ties
between those close to the president to criminal networks have sustained those concerns.42
Individuals who are fortunate enough not
to see their incomes negatively affected by
COVID-19-related policies and the economic
contraction have watched their savings grow. At
the same time, news and attention on cryptocurrencies have generated new engagement.43
As a result, investment in cryptocurrencies
has ballooned and diversified, making markets
and transactions more complex and potentially
making it easier to hide illicit transactions.44
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Cryptomania: A Real or Virtual Money
Laundering Threat?
Newspapers and blogs regularly publish news
of the use of cryptocurrencies, and Bitcoin in
particular, as the new vehicle for money laundering. Recently the non-profit journalism and
investigative organization InSight Crime published a report with the eye-catching title, “The
Digital Gold Rush: 5 Ways Bitcoin Helps Organized Crime.”45 But when it came to money
laundering, the article only mentioned two cases, which appeared relatively small in scope. In
one case, the funds from an extortion racket in
Brazil were laundered, and, in another, Bitcoin
was used to deposit small amounts of a cartel’s ill-gotten gains to hide their provenance
(the “smurfing” of funds mentioned earlier on
page 15 of this report). Similarly, another article
on the same site ran a story under the flashy
headline “Bitcoin Cryptocurrency Adds to Venezuela Money Laundering Risks,” but notes that
Bitcoin is not the greatest risk.46 Instead, it said
that the more significant threats are the dark
web and other, more hidden, cryptocurrencies
described earlier in this paper. Even then, citing a Chainalysis report (referenced earlier in
this report) and a report by the Consortium of
Investigative Journalists and Buzzfeed News,
the article concluded that “the vast majority of
illicit gains are still laundered through the traditional banking system, not cryptocurrency.”47
The DEA 2020 National Drug Threat Assessment raised concerns about cryptocurrency
being used to move and launder funds during
COVID-19. As a result of border restrictions
stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic, the
report says that “large amount of U.S. currency are being held along the U.S. side, awaiting
transport to Mexico.”48 The report argues that
money laundering organizations use “virtual currency automated teller machines (ATMs)
to aid in the movement of illicit bulk currency”
without providing specific examples or cases.49
Later, as this report describes, virtual currency
is increasingly used for traditional trade-based
money laundering, although there are few specifics.

There are other reasons to remain vigilant about
cryptocurrencies with regard to money laundering. For one, cryptocurrencies and, in particular,
privacy functions, through either coin, such as
Monero, or through tumblers and mixers, will
continue to evolve as monitoring and law enforcement capacities improve. Second is the
apparent rise of China as a market for illicit cryptocurrency transactions. Kim Grauer and Henry
Updegrave argue that “China also stands out
for receiving a disproportionate share of funds
sent from addresses associated with stolen
funds and ransomware. Some of this may come
from cryptocurrency theft and ransomware activity associated with the Lazarus Group, a cybercriminal syndicate linked to the North Korean government.”50 In recent years, a pattern has
emerged of reliance on over-the-counter brokers in China that specialize in money laundering. These brokers, of which they focus on the
270 most active deposit addresses, appear to
be developing money laundering as a “key part
of the business model.”51 This may, in fact, make
them easier to track for law enforcement officials, especially since many of them come from
exchanges at high risk for illicit activity, including those in high-risk jurisdictions where regulation and enforcement is lax or non-existent
and from identifiable sources, such as mixers
or gambling platforms. One such example, as
detailed by Schoenberg, was Binance, the Cayman Islands incorporated but Singapore-based
cryptocurrency exchange, which federal agents
determined handled more illicit funds than any
other exchange, including funds tied to a fentanyl trafficking ring.52
The last reason it will be important to monitor
cryptocurrencies for a potential uptick in money
laundering activities is that it is still too early to
tell the long-term effects of COVID-19 on illicit
activities in the sector. As detailed above, several studies and investigations have detected
increased activity specifically focused on China in one instance and accounts and brokers
in another. At the same time, despite early predictions of the eventual irrelevance of cryptocurrencies,53 Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies
appear to be with us to stay, and even expand in
the public discussion, if not in their use. As the
market evolves, if there is demand from criminal elements, their needs will produce adaptations, especially as the trend toward cashless
economies accelerates. In addition, given that
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tracing illicit cryptocurrency activity involves a
substantial degree of retrospective attribution,
it may take several years before we have a clear
picture of the significance of any trends in the
use of cryptocurrencies for money laundering
during COVID-19.

China’s Ban on Cryptocurrencies:
Beyond the Babble
China’s recent ban on cryptocurrencies has
received a lot of coverage, as well as mockery, given that it has already done so 18 times
before.54 Much has also been written on the
motivations behind the Chinese government
taking this step. There is the more benevolent
narrative that encouraging or even permitting
the mining of cryptocurrencies runs counter
to the Chinese leadership’s determination to
become carbon neutral by 2060.55 While undoubtedly a factor that would have been taken
into consideration, it is more likely this move
was taken due to the government’s discomfort toward the presence and usage of a decentralized, non-sovereign currency.56 This
line of reasoning gains greater credence when
considering that plans for the digital Yuan
continue to move toward becoming a reality,
which, if successful, would see the release of
the world’s first state-backed digital currency.
In this approach, it appears China will stand
alone, however, as it is unlikely the United
States and governments of Europe would make
any similar moves. In response to questions on
whether the United States would consider a
China-like prohibition, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chair Gary Gensler recently
reaffirmed that the U.S. approach ensures the
cryptocurrency industry adheres to investor
and consumer protection rules, anti-money
laundering regulations, and tax laws.57 Similarly, the recent strengthening of EU regulations
on cryptocurrencies echoes the transatlantic sentiment that an outright ban is unlikely.58
Despite this divergence in approaches, law
enforcement agencies in the United States
and Europe could do worse than pay attention to trends that unfold in China in the wake
of the ban. Particularly when considering how
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the use of cryptocurrencies for money-laundering purposes has permeated criminal activity in China,59 this test case of prohibition
could provide valuable insights that might
better inform efforts at regulation elsewhere.
This is particularly relevant if policymakers intend to avoid unwittingly incentivizing criminals into seeking out more obscure and harder
to trace methods for trading cryptocurrencies
and, therefore, potentially obfuscating money-laundering trails. One immediate observation in the case of China’s cryptocurrency ban
is that problematic over-the-counter trading,
identified as a significant problem by Chainalysis,60 will likely persist, and an increased number
of Chinese traders and miners will use virtual
private networks (VPNs)61 to avoid detection.62
Perhaps of greater relevance to the conversation on money laundering is the suggestion
that the Chinese clampdown on the more established exchanges could push traders to use
decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms, such as
Uniswap. Eleanor Olcott has noted that the use
of such platforms, which don’t have the same
“know your client” (KYC) obligations as the
conventional exchanges, have been growing
in China in the past year amid the banning of
cryptocurrencies. In fact, from January to June
2021, US$256bn in cryptocurrency was traded
through such DeFi platforms in China.63 Therefore, banning conventional, regulated exchanges appears to have pushed traders—both legal and illicit—toward the use of infrastructure
that is darker and less traceable. Until now, DeFi
has had a relatively patchy record.64 However,
with such voluminous transactions now taking
place on these unregulated platforms, there
now runs the risk they become established
mainstays of the cryptotrading infrastructure,
which would be an appealing development for
those looking to layer their ill-gotten proceeds.
In terms of immediate recommendations in
light of the experience of the Chinese prohibition of cryptocurrencies, it would be wise to
consider added scrutiny of DeFi when developing regulations surrounding cryptocurrencies—particularly pushing for the necessity of
KYC protocols for these to operate. Another
recommendation borne out of this example is
that DeFi is now moving into the mainstream.
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Those who choose regulation over prohibition,
such as the United States and Europe, would be
wise to explore what types of monitoring tools
are available or possible for decentralized systems.

FINTECH AND E-COMMERCE:
PEER-TO-PEER FINANCE AND
COMMERCE
For many of the same reasons explained above
with cryptocurrencies, it may be too early to tell
the extent to which COVID-19 has incentivized
the integration of FinTech and peer-to-peer finance into illicit transactions and money-laundering schemes. A joint study by the World Bank
Group and the University of Cambridge notes a
strong uptick in the use of FinTech during the
pandemic.65 Based on surveys of 118 central
bank and financial regulators between June and
August 2020, the study reveals that digital payments and remittances increased 60 percent,
digital banking services expanded by 22 percent, and digital savings and deposits through
FinTech grew by 19 percent.
Yet along with this rise in digital transactions
during the pandemic, social distancing and
lockdown measures became a hindrance to
regulators. The report states that the regulators
surveyed noted challenges in performing core
regulatory functions such as on-site inspection
of firms (49 percent overall and 65 percent in
advanced economies), difficulties in external
communications (43 percent), and coordination
with domestic agencies (43 percent).66
While challenges exist in assessing what impact
COVID-19 has had on the adoption of modern
FinTech and peer-to-peer platforms by criminal
elements, we do know from the above that use
spiked at a time when regulators were not operating at full capacity. While many FinTechs are
generally more coherently regulated than cryptocurrencies with an institutional third-party
guaranteeing transactions, the relative ease
and low costs of transactions and their impersonal nature may well have made them a platform for illicit activity.

There is more evidence of an increase in likely
illicit activity in e-commerce. Trade mispricing
in person-to-person transactions is a heavily
used technique. Increasingly, however, that has
moved to online commerce, a trend that has
increased under COVID-19 as global trade and
supply chains were disrupted by the pandemic
and the economic contraction.
The patterns were already taking shape before
2020. According to Christoph Wronka, “money
launderers have over the years mastered the
art of using e-commerce websites to take advantage of this vulnerability and proceed with
their illegal activities. These types of money
laundering activities are referred to as transaction laundering.” 67 While they reportedly occur
on e-commerce platforms like eBay and Pinduoduo on a large scale, they also happen on
a smaller scale at a frequency that makes them
a useful means for criminals to launder money, with lower levels of potential detection. In
one case in 2018, an author found their identity had been assumed on Amazon, and their
books were being sold at vastly inflated prices.68 They speculated that stolen credit cards
could have been used to repeat purchase the
book, with the author pocketing the 60 percent
commission from Amazon. But the basic means
of buying overpriced goods, which may even
be worthless, as a means of transferring funds
elsewhere is common. In the case of Amazon,
when the overpriced book scam was brought to
its attention, it started withdrawing several other books; however the adaptability of criminals
suggests they would migrate to other products
and platforms.
As with FinTech, the e-commerce sector saw a
large surge in usage due to COVID-19. A Forbes
article concluded that COVID-19 accelerated
the adoption and integration of e-commerce by
four to six years.69 According to a UN Conference on Trade and Development report, online
retail sales grew from 16 percent to 18 percent
of global retail.70 However, the number as an aggregate amount is deceptive; it includes online
travel and service retailers severely hurt by social distancing and lockdown measures. For example, Expedia’s sales shrunk by 65.9 percent
in the same period, Booking Holdings contracted by 63.3 percent, and Airbnb by 37.1 percent.
In contrast, Alibaba grew by 20 percent, Amazon
by 38 percent, Pinduoduo by 65.9 percent, and
Shopify by 95.6 percent. The biggest gains were
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in business-to-business e-commerce through
online market platforms and electronic data interchange transactions.
The increased volume of traffic and money exchanged via e-commerce provided a much-expanded avenue for transaction laundering of
funds that would typically have been washed
through casinos pre-pandemic, a medium widely used in Asia and the Americas alike for money
laundering. Prior to the pandemic, several casinos in Australia and Canada (British Colombia,
in particular) had been investigated for noncompliance with money-laundering regulations.
In Sydney in May 2021, casinos agreed to ban
the use of cash, requiring card payments. Several countries reported a rise in online gambling
at times when casinos and gambling venues
were closed during the pandemic.71
There are various ways to use casinos to launder money, most simply by buying casino chips
and subsequently claiming them back as winnings, validated by a check or receipt. While
similar tactics can be used in online gambling,
using cash in physical casinos provides an obvious advantage over online gambling. In September 2020, the Financial Times reported that
in China, money launderers used leading online
shopping sites to transfer billions of dollars to
offshore gambling sites.72 People seeking to
evade China’s capital controls placed fake orders on various shopping sites and received
credit to their gambling accounts. According to
Chinese police, around US$2 billion was laundered through phony e-commerce purchases.
The Financial Times similarly reported that in
one prominent case, police in the eastern city of
Wuxi found 600 million fake packages had been
inserted into courier firms’ tracking systems
by company insiders to complete false e-commerce transactions. Many of those same package tracking numbers appeared in money-laundering cases in two other Chinese cities where
more than RMB7bn was allegedly funneled to
offshore gambling sites.
According to one of the affected e-commerce
sites, “gambling syndicates operating under
false pretenses on e[-]commerce platforms is
an industry-wide problem.”73 Australia’s largest casino operator, Crown Resorts, is accused
of accepting deposits over the AUS$10,000
threshold at its Perth location, dating back to
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2014. Possibly hundreds of millions of dollars
were processed through this scheme. The setup was reportedly linked to Chinese organized
crime (the Crown group had pulled out of Macau in 2017 after facing an investigation from
Beijing).
The pattern follows an already well-worn path
for money launderers established before the
COVID-19 pandemic in a network of shadow banking and mis-priced trade. Traditionally, criminals from China, India, and Pakistan
would use their respective alternative banking
systems (hui k’uan, hawala, and hundi, respectively). However, based on trust and policed
through fear of ostracization, these systems
were closed to those outside the community.
Over the past few years, a new means of transferring funds has emerged using the official
Chinese banking system and is open to criminals from any community. The system uses
Chinese businesses in the respective countries
and is predicated on having bank accounts in
their country of residence and in China.
For example, to transfer the profits of drugs
sales from the United States to Mexico, the
funds would be passed to a Chinese business
operating in the United States. This business
would then transfer an equivalent sum in Yuan
from its Chinese bank account to the Chinese bank account of a Chinese firm operating in Mexico. This business would then pass
the funds in pesos to the intended recipient in
Mexico. Alternatively, instances of trade-based
money laundering have also been found, with
goods—often clothing or footwear—being purchased in China and sold in Mexico, with the
proceeds passed to the cartel. Either way, the
funds have been transferred outside the remit
of Western law enforcement agencies. Reuters
has detailed how the process unfolds in several
stages:
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Step One: A Mexican criminal syndicate wants
to bring proceeds from U.S. drug sales back to
Mexico. It contacts Chinese money brokers operating in Mexico to see who offers the cheapest rates.
Step Two: The parties agree on a commission
and the amount to be laundered, for example
$150,000.
Step Three: The Chinese broker, using encrypted phone messages, would send the cartel
three things:
1. A code word
2. The number of a US burner phone
3. Unique serial number of an authentic $1 bill
Step Four: The Mexican crime group shares
those details with a drug dealer in the United
States, who calls the burner phone and identifies himself by using the code word. He arranges to meet a US-based money courier working
for the Chinese broker.
Step Five: The drug dealer and the money
courier meet in public. The courier hands over
a $1 bill with the unique serial number. When
that that is validated, the dealer hands over the
cash, keeping the bill as a “receipt.”
Step Six: The courier takes the $150,000 to a
US-based Chinese merchant who has a bank
account in China. The merchant then performs
a currency swap known as a “mirror transaction.” They take possession of the US cash and
then transfers $150,000 worth of Chinese yuan
from their Chinese bank account to the money broker’s Chinese account, using an account
number provided to them by the courier.
Step Seven: The cartel’s drug cash is now sitting in a Chinese bank, outside the view of US
law enforcement. The broker has two options to
send it on to Mexico to the drug cartel.
Step Eight: Option 1 is to do another ‘mirror
transaction.’ The $150,000 worth of yuan is now
transferred from the money broker’s Chinese
account to the Chinese bank account of a Mexico-based businessperson. That Mexico-based
businessperson then provides $150,000 worth
of pesos to the money broker in Mexico, who
delivers that cash to the cartel.Under option 2,

the Chinese money broker buys $150,000 worth
of consumer products in China, such as clothing, and exports them to Mexico. The goods are
then sold, and the proceeds delivered to the
cartell.74

One of the major challenges for underground
banking systems arises if there is an imbalance
in the demand for currencies; the system works
better when the demand is roughly balanced.
For example, capital flight from the Philippines
in the 1990s was generally equivalent to inward
remittances from overseas workers.75 Flows of
drug money between Hong Kong and Thailand,
however, were more one-sided, with three times
the funds flowing into Hong Kong compared
with Thailand. This requires regular compensation to balance the accounts.
In the case of Chinese banking systems in the
Americas, the system works because there is a
rough balance between the demand and supply of dollars. Drug dealers in the United States
offer a supply of dollars (to be converted into
local currency), while Chinese expatriate communities demand dollars to circumvent Chinese
capital controls.
These patterns may well have been updated and
will continue to develop. What we will not know,
except with more time, is to what extent money
laundering via e-commerce kept pace or even
grew disproportionately during the COVID-19
pandemic with consumer and business transactions shifting online. As a recent Global Financial Integrity article describes, trade-based
money laundering is one of the “weakest links in
the fight against corruption.”76 For drug cartels
in Mexico and Colombia, the article says this
means of money laundering is “low risk and high
reward,” largely due to the corruption of public officials—customs officials in particular—
and the lack of political will. Questions remain
whether and how the COVID-19 pandemic and
e-commerce boom that accompanied it have
changed this in the short and long term. Chinese e-commerce sites used to launder money show there is a wide scope for retailers to
facilitate that process unwittingly. There’s also
another potential upside, however. While mispricing in real-world traditional trade is often
facilitated by corrupt customs officials far from
the businesses originally engaged in the trans-

14

action, e-commerce may open an avenue for
more effective monitoring and tracking of illicit
processes by independent transnational bodies
and regulators.

The Need for International Collaboration: Tax
Havens and the Case of the Pandora Papers
The existence of tax havens, jurisdictions with
low tax regimes that, more importantly, fail to
disclose financial information with other jurisdictions, provide a potential opening to launder
illicit funds. Tax havens operate on the basis
that they can accept money without reporting it
to the country in which it originated. According
to U.S. economist Gabriel Zucman, 8 percent of
the world’s wealth –US$7.6 trillion—is held in
tax havens.77
In recent years, several data leaks from tax havens have revealed the extent to which companies and wealthy individuals seek to minimize
their tax payments, along with instances of the
use of tax havens for money laundering. The
most recent leak—the Pandora Papers—is the
largest thus far, but the data does not yet reveal whether offshore banking has been used
for tax avoidance, tax evasion, or money laundering. Earlier leaks included the 2019 FinCEN
Leaks, the 2017 Paradise Papers, focusing on
the records of law firm Appleby, based in Bermuda, the Singapore-based Asiaciti Trust, and
the 2016 Panama Papers, which disclosed the
records of Panama-based law firm, Mossack
Fonseca. HSBC Jersey’s account holders were
leaked in 2012 and HSBC Geneva’s in 2009.
While several legal actions are ongoing concerning Mossack Fonseca, cursory checks on
identity coupled with an unwillingness to pry
too deeply into the source of wealth provided
potential opportunities for money laundering.
According to the International Consortium of
Investigative Journalists, two months after its
records were breached, Mossack Fonseca could
not identify the owners of more than 70 percent
of 28,500 active companies in the British Virgin
Islands and 75 percent of 10,500 active shell
companies in Panama.78
While some moves have attempted to make tax
havens more transparent, progress is slow, and
steps made in one jurisdiction shift business to
less transparent jurisdictions. Furthermore, as
successive leaks have shown, many of those in
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charge of running financial systems are using
loopholes provided by tax havens. This creates
an environment conducive for illegal activities
to take place alongside legal tax avoidance
schemes.
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CONCLUSION
Criminals are highly innovative and adaptable.
The emergence of new technologies and ways
of conducting business have provided unique
opportunities to commit crimes and launder
funds. The emergence of cryptocurrencies over
the last decade has provided a new means to
launder and transfer funds anonymously, with
regulators slow to respond to the latest challenges. Even the COVID-19 pandemic presented
new opportunities to make money illegally.
For now, at least, the pandemic’s impact on
money laundering appears to have been more
balanced. Despite many traditional means of
laundering money—such as through casinos
or high cash turnover businesses like restaurants—being closed off because of government-imposed lockdowns, there has not yet
been a significant detectable jump in the use
of cryptocurrencies or FinTech in money laundering. In many cases, criminals were forced to
warehouse cash, raising the risk of discovery.
Meanwhile, the same government COVID-related restrictions hindered those seeking to tackle
money laundering.
Nevertheless, it may be too early to tell. The
increasing sophistication of financial products,
coupled with the secrecy surrounding numerous jurisdictions, facilitates money laundering.
Financial institutions are developing increasingly sophisticated tools, including through artificial intelligence, to identify money laundering, but opportunistic criminals are often quick
to adapt and develop new means of avoiding
scrutiny. Better and faster data-sharing at both
the national and international level would help
identify the proceeds of crime, as would an enhanced capacity of law enforcement agencies
to analyze suspicious activity reports.
There is growing evidence that larger transnational criminal groups are becoming increasingly cooperative rather than competitive. This
may well enable them to increase their profits,
but it makes them more vulnerable to detection and harder to stay under the radar. At the
same time, organized crime presents a threat
to stability, and the sums involved threaten to
capture states. The threat is not confined to
drug-producing countries but also affects im-

portant distribution hubs, from Central America to Europe. The recent decision to place the
Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, under police
protection because of an ongoing trial relating
to cocaine smuggling demonstrates the scale of
the threat.79
To successfully counter money laundering would
require a concerted international approach.
While one tax haven is willing to undercut another to attract unscrupulous business, actions
taken in other jurisdictions simply displace the
problem to the benefit of less scrupulous countries. The situation is further exacerbated by
the existence of a few narco-states in which
the scale of criminality—narcotic production
or transit—provides safe havens for criminals.
These countries act as magnets and undermine
global efforts.
In addition, countries such as China and Russia
appear ambivalent about the challenges facing
Western countries. While China has taken steps
to tackle the misuse of cryptocurrencies, the
emergence of its domestic banking system as
a new means to launder and transfer funds between, for example, the United States and Mexico, provides a particular challenge for Western
law enforcement agencies.
There is also a distinct challenge for technology firms. While law enforcement agencies
recognize that criminals will misuse new technologies, technology companies appear more
reactive, focused more on the positive uses for
their technology. Overpricing goods on digital
marketplaces, for instance, provides a new and
relatively easy means of laundering money. Unless companies can easily identify overvalued
products or ensure that those using their services are easily identifiable, this will remain a
challenge.
These challenges in tracking and understanding
the effects of COVID-19 and related government
measures point to the need for regulators, state
security, and financial sector officials to reflect
on the past near-two years. Despite the current
lack of data on how the global pandemic has
affected the tools and tactics in the movement
of illicit profits, there are potential areas of collaboration that investigators and researchers
should focus on in their anti-money laundering
efforts. Some of those are outlined below.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on
the global economy, markets, commercial relations, global supply chain, and daily life of citizens will be felt for years to come. The same is
true of the virus’s effects on illicit markets and
money laundering. Changes in the structure of
global financial markets had already started
before the COVID-19 pandemic but have been
accelerated by the events of 2020. The recommendations that follow respond to both those
pre-existing trends as well as likely impacts
stemming from COVID-19 and its associated
effects on markets and finance.
Continue to monitor new trends in virtual
and electronic markets and finance
It is difficult to understand all the impacts of
COVID-19 on human behavior and markets in
the near-two years of experience we have had.
Patterns and trends will take longer to discern
and address. But just as we are already witnessing a spectrum of effects on everything
from increased integration of work-from-home
schedules to urban design to the integration of
e-commerce as a regular part of our consumer
habits—there will be an impact on the organization and operation of criminal syndicates.
Given the accelerated growth of online commerce and peer-to-peer finance in daily life,
these innovations and tools will likely affect
criminal transactions. In short, it will be necessary when monitoring and prosecuting illicit
activity not to assume it will be business as
usual from 2021 and beyond.
Update and tighten regulation and
monitoring of FinTech and cryptocurrencies
While Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies
have not translated into as large and central
a market as many imagined for illicit transactions pre-COVID-19, the need to push financial
transactions and money laundering to either
virtual means or to hold on to cash indicates
that the move toward these platforms may just
be beginning. This may be particularly true as

17

many criminal groups will have warehoused
cash during the periods of lockdown that they
could not launder through more traditional means. In the early days of the pandemic,
the FATF outlined a series of policy responses to address AML and CTF to respond to
COVID-19-related threats. They remain valid
absent the COVID-19 pandemic and include:
•

Domestic coordination to assess the
impact of COVID-19 on AML/CTF risks and
systems;

•

Strengthened communication with the
private sector; and

•

Encouraging the full use of a risk-based
approach to customer due diligence.80

In all these cases, special attention should be
paid to peer-to-peer financial platforms and
e-commerce.

In cryptocurrency markets, focus on known
over-the-counter brokers
Recent research indicates that rather than a
widespread phenomenon of using cryptocurrencies for money laundering, illicit activities—
including money laundering—tend to be conducted through anonymous exchanges, using
the mixers and tumblers described above. Better monitoring and enforcement of money laundering laws on those brokers will help choke off
the primary illicit practice in the cryptocurrency
ecosystem. Along the same lines, as researchers and law enforcement officials identify the
owners of wallets used by criminals, they should
share that information through international law
enforcement and financial agencies such as
Interpol, Europol, and the FATF. Such an effort
could create an alert system similar to Interpol’s
red list for wanted international criminals but
dedicated to known wallets and brokers engaging in illicit transactions.
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Upgrade government capacity to track and
understand the cryptocurrency world
As criminals and the cryptocurrency world
evolved and adapted to new opportunities in
money laundering, so has the software to detect it. Money laundering software that helps
officials identify potential sites and operations
related to money laundering based on tested
high-risk areas, transactions, and wallets can
help track and capture or at least shut down
bad actors in the rapidly changing cryptocurrency ecosystem. This will also require training
and staffing government regulatory bodies. According to one scholar, “relatively few current
government employees have the skills to use
this technology to its full potential.”81

Work with China to identify and shut down
money laundering operations
While research has identified various China-based operations actively laundering money
through cryptocurrency markets, e-commerce,
or shadow banks, Beijing has also demonstrated a willingness to take on these bad actors.
One of the founders of several of the cryptocurrency brokers mentioned earlier, Zhao Dong,
pled guilty in May 2021 to money laundering
charges, and other arrests have continued with
up to 1,100 individuals arrested because of the
Chinese Communist Party’s crackdown on money laundering.82 According to one report, the
reasons stem in part from a desire to reduce
capital flight and a crackdown on illegal money
transactions. While in the case of the Chinese
e-vendor Pinduoduo, they had not knowingly
engaged in the money laundering scheme that
used its platform. Given China’s growing global
network and footprint commercially and financially, a desire to project itself as a legitimate
economic actor will work to the advantage of
regulators and law enforcement agencies that
combat money laundering.
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